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Some argue that foreign investors would not be attracted to countries where uncertainty induced by 
arbitrariness in corruption, is pervasive. On the other hand, it is contended that MNEs have been 
seeking the investment opportunities where they can exploit rent benefits, so they would not mind 
paying a small price for the big gain. Consequentially, theory cannot provide us with the dominant 
framework to hypothesize the relationship between the corruption and the FDI attractiveness of host 
countries. Empirical results of this study suggest that corruption generally causes a harmful effect on 
attracting FDI.  
 





Recently, the governance problems of countries in transitional periods have renewed 
interest for both scholars and practitioners in finding out what kind of  relationship exists 
between corruption and economic performance. The World Bank (2000) calls for immediate 
and practical strategies to reduce corruption levels by noting the harmful effects of 
corruption on economic growth and social stability. Also, as corruption has become a major 
challenge to the governance in many countries, it is also now on the policy agenda of many 
governmental and international agencies (USAID 2005).  
According to Wei (1999), corruption is a major obstacle for economic growth in many 
ways. Corruption hinders economic development by reducing domestic investment, 
discouraging foreign direct investment, encouraging overspending in government, and 
distorting the composition of government spending. Corruption is believed not only to hurt 
the static efficiency but also to discourage investment, which is considered an important 
factor for economic growth, especially for those countries in dire need of the capital 
accumulation. Consequentially, policy prescriptions have been made for countries to reduce 
the level of corruption to attract more FDI. Actually, this argument has been confirmed by a 
number of previous studies.  
While some researchers (e.g., Mauro 1995) have argued and confirmed that economic 
growth is barely possible in corrupted countries because high corruption hinders domestic 
and foreign investment, although there are also counterarguments against that. Bayley (1966) 
argues that “corruption in developing nations is not necessarily antipathetic to the 
development of modern economic and social systems; that corruption serves in part at least a 
beneficial function in developing societies” (719). Huntington (1968) also contends that “In 
terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, 
dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy (386).” What 
both Bayley (1966) and Huntington (1968) argue is that in developing countries where 
cumbersome regulation is pervasive, corruption may actually improve efficiency and help 
growth. Until the 1997 financial crisis, some Southeast Asian countries seemed to provide 
 JUNG-YEOP WOO  72 
 
evidence that corruption actually helped economic growth. Indonesia, Thailand, and other 
countries were often used as examples. According to Tanzi (2002), those countries have been 
said to grow fast in spite of—or even because of—a high level of corruption. Those countries 
also have attracted a considerable flow of foreign capital (Campos et al. 2001).  
Even though Bayley (1966) and Huntington (1968) do not test their argument, their 
arguments have some insights when we consider the strategic behavior of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). Those MNEs have been seeking better places to invest their capital 
resources. MNEs will choose a specific country or region based on their expectation about 
the location-specific conditions. 1  Among many factors included in the location-specific 
conditions, favorable macroeconomic, microeconomic, and FDI-specific government 
policies are important for the MNEs because these factors are related to how well they can 
exploit their advantages. According to Li and Resnick (2003), it would increase the 
probability of those states being chosen as the FDI destination if the host government 
provides preferential treatment for the MNEs. Thus, from the MNEs’ points of view, 
corruption would not matter as long as the host government secures their benefit from their 
investment. Even more, MNEs are ready to pay a small price for the big gain. MNEs might 
favor the corrupted government when they have to deal with risky investment environments 
because they can “buy” favorable governmental policies. Tarzi (1991) also argues that MNEs 
would try to form and help allied local groups maintain their advantages. If this is the case, 
MNEs might prefer those countries where “individual leaders … were known to accept 
private payments in exchange for their efforts to preserve status quo (Tarzi 244).” Thus, it is 
not clear how corruption affects a country’s FDI attractiveness.  
Before any hypothesis is proposed, one thing should be noted—this research is based on 
the logic of economic development. There have been debates on the effects of foreign direct 
investment on domestic economic growth. Recently, many scholars have contended that 
foreign direct investment actually leads to economic growth.2 My argument will be based on 
those previous studies that found foreign direct investment will provide capital that may not 
be available in host country’s domestic market, helping their economic growth. Following 
those theories, it would be better for countries to attract more foreign direct investment to 
develop their economies. Even more, for those countries lacking capital resources and 
technologies, MNEs are “often ‘the only hope’” (Biersteker 1978: 2). Consequentially, 
countries will compete for the limited resources, which is the total amount of FDI available 
in a specific year. 
In this paper, I attempt to empirically discover the relationship between the perceived 
level of corruption and the FDI attractiveness of countries, since previous theoretical works 
provide no dominant frameworks to form hypotheses. I will test the effect of corruption on 
the FDI attractiveness by using a sample of 90 countries from 1984 to 2004.  
This paper will be organized as follows: in the next section, I will discuss the different 
perspectives on the relationship between the corruption and the FDI and briefly survey the 
previous studies on the relationship between them. Then, in the research design section, I 
will explain variables and models. Moving to the analysis section, I will analyze four 
different models. In the first analysis section, I will test the general effect of corruption on 
the FDI attractiveness for 90 countries. In the consecutive analysis, I will compare the 
differential effects of corruption on various sub-group samples. Finally, I will conclude with 
                                                          
1 Dunning 1992. 
2 Firebaugh 1992; De Soysa and Oneal 1999; Jensen 2003. 




policy implications. With the findings from the analysis of the latest data of 90 countries for 
21 years, I expect that the effect of corruption on FDI attractiveness will be revealed. 
 
1.1. Differing Perspectives on the Corruption and the FDI 
 
It is only recently that corruption and FDI have been studied jointly (Habib and 
Zurawicki 2002). In the past, the views on corruption’s effect on economic performance have 
been divergent among scholars. Besides Bayley (1966) and Huntington (1968), Theobald 
(1990) also argues that corruption can help economic growth. He argues that corruption can 
actually assist capital formation and allow business interests to penetrate the bureaucracy. 
However, those studies have not provided the dominant theories with respect to the 
relationship between corruption and FDI. 
Actually, more theories have been developed about the negative effect of corruption on 
FDI. Many scholars (Drabek and Payne 2001; Wei 1997) have focused on the fact that 
corruption is not transparent. This non-transparency means additional costs for the MNEs. 
Wei (1997: 1) argues that “corruption embeds arbitrariness and creates uncertainty.” Thus, 
foreign investors would not be attracted by countries where uncertainty, induced by 
arbitrariness in corruption, is pervasive. 
To study how the perceived level of corruption affects the FDI attractiveness of countries, 
it is important to see why MNEs invest abroad. John H. Dunning has provided the dominant 
framework in this regard. According to Dunning (2001: 176), the extent and pattern of 
international production, financed by FDI and undertaken by MNEs, will be determined by 
considering the combination of three sets of advantages: 
 
(1) The (net) competitive advantages which firms of one nationality possess over those of 
another nationality in supplying any particular market or set of markets. These advantages may 
arise either from the firm’s privileged ownership of, or access to, a set of income-generating 
assets, or from their ability to coordinate these assets with other assets across national 
boundaries in a way that benefits them relative to their competitors or potential competitors. 
(2) The extent to which firms perceive it to be in their best interest to internalize the 
markets for the generation and/or the use of these assets; and by so doing add value to them. 
(3) The extent to which firms choose to locate these value-adding activities outside their 
national boundaries. 
 
Those advantages are so-called OLI variables: “O” stands for ownership advantages; “L” 
for location advantages; and “I” for internalization advantages. Since the purpose of this 
study is to analyze the impact of the perceived level of corruption on the FDI attractiveness 
of countries, I will assume the existence of ownership and internalization advantages of firms 
is constant. 3  My attention focuses on the host country’s location-specific advantages 
comprising natural resources, physical and social infrastructure, and intangible resources 
such as policies of governments that create favorable business environment. Li and Resnick 
(2003) also point out that policies on tariffs, domestic corporate taxation, investment or tax 
regulation of foreign firms, profit repatriation or transfer pricing, royalties on extracted 
natural resources, antitrust regulation, technology transfer requirements, intellectual property 
protections, and labor market regulation are important factors that MNEs would consider. 
                                                          
3 This assumption has been adopted by many case studies on FDI. See Afriyie 1998. 
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MNEs must utilize the factors in foreign countries to earn profits from their investment. 
Therefore, the location-specific advantages of different countries are very important in 
determining which countries will be more attractive to the MNEs.  
Li and Resnick (2003) focus on the ways in which democratic institutions in host 
countries can diminish the MNE’s ability to exploit and enhance their positions. With their 
unique position toward host countries, especially toward developing countries, as a source of 
capital, technology, and managerial expertise, MNEs want to utilize advantages from their 
position. It has been true that MNEs have had special negotiating advantages until recently 
(Tarzi 1991).  
However, MNEs’ bargaining power against host countries can be affected generally by 
two factors. First, competition among MNEs for investment opportunities can affect the 
bargaining position of both MNEs and host countries. According to Tarzi (1991), the 
bargaining power of host countries was weak in the 1950s and 1960s. The availability of 
alternative investment opportunities weakened the bargaining power of individual countries. 
However, the increasing number of MNEs from various regions has provided host countries 
with the option of choice. This increased option of choice, in turn, would enhance the 
position of host country in a bargaining table.  
Second, more importantly for this study, the attitudes and beliefs of the ruling elites 
regarding foreign investment can constrain the power of MNEs. MNEs have been seeking 
the investment opportunities where they can maintain monopolistic or oligopolistic positions. 
However, democratic institutions are not always favorable to FDI. As Li and Resnick (2003) 
point out, since many MNEs have decreased or have a potential to decrease the market 
competition, elected public officials in democratic governments are motivated to limit 
MNEs’ monopoly or oligopoly positions through constraining public policy. In democracies, 
elected public officials prefer more inward FDI in the belief that it would improve national 
economic benefits. Thus, they presumably want to upgrade linkages between FDI and the 
local economy. For example, a host government may require MNEs to use local suppliers. 
Even more, a host government can change their once favorable policy toward MNEs. In 
reaction, MNEs may prefer the countries “where individual leaders in host countries were 
known to accept private payments in exchange for their efforts to preserve the status quo” 
(Tarzi 1991: 244).  
To gain full benefits from their investment, it is very important for MNEs to keep 
maintaining the original terms that favored them, when the bargaining advantage may shift to 
the host government. For that purpose, the development of allied local groups is an important 
instrument for MNEs to maintain their dominant position (Biersteker 1978). The most 
important reason for those elite groups in host countries to join the MNEs is that their gain 
outweighs the loss. Of course, private material gain would be considered with the utmost 
importance. 
In theory, it is not only the type of regime, but also the behavior of elite groups in host 
countries that can affect the decision making of MNEs. In sum, it has been theorized that 
MNEs prefer the investment environment where they can easily influence the government 
and elite groups, so they can maintain their dominant position. At the same time, those 
government officials and elite groups in host countries may exchange preferable policies 
toward MNEs with their private benefits.  
Consequentially, theory cannot provide us with the dominant framework to hypothesize 
the relationship between the corruption and the FDI attractiveness of host countries. It is now 
more a matter of empirical testing. 





2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Since Rose-Ackerman (1975), a substantial number of economists have theorized and 
tried to emprically test the impact of corruption on economic performance. Even though a 
great number of studies have been produced by scholars in business and economics,4 an 
increasing number of studies also have been produced by political scientists recently.5 
Mauro (1995) provides the first systematic empirical analysis of the effect of corruption 
on investment using a corruption index. Mauro (1995) uses an index of corruption from 
Business International (1984), a publication of the Economist Intelligence Unit which 
supplies subjective assessments of 56 risk factors to private investors for 68 countries. Mauro 
finds that corruption lowers private investment, reducing economic growth. His results hold 
even after controlling for other determinants of investment. His findings even suggest that 
corruption still hurts economic growth in countries where bureaucratic regulations are very 
cumbersome, which was expected by some scholars otherwise. However, the dataset he uses 
for the analysis is limited in terms of time span to just one year. Basically, his study is a 
cross-sectional analysis, so it is difficult to see the dynamics of the effect of corruption on 
FDI. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption is much more distortionary and costly 
than taxation because of its illegality and the need for secrecy. They list post-Communist 
Russia as an example. To invest in a Russian company, a foreign investor must bribe every 
agency involved in foreign investment. That factor has kept foreign investors from investing 
in Russia. However, their argument is entirely based on an economic model, not backed by 
empirical data. 
Wei (1997) confirms the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) by analyzing empirical 
data. He argues that corruption causes more serious problems than tax in terms of distorting 
the efficient allocation of resources because corruption is “not transparent, not preannounced, 
and carries a much poorer enforcement of an agreement between a briber and a bribe” (1). 
That is, corruption by nature has a characteristic of arbitrariness, so it creates uncertainty. He 
finds that the effect of uncertainty on foreign direct investment is negative and statistically 
significant. If the level of corruption-induced uncertainty increases from the level of 
Singapore to that of Mexico, it would be equivalent to raise the tax rate on multinational 
firms by 32 percentage points. Wei (2000) extends his previous research by using broader 
panel data. 
Most recently, Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig (2006) argue that corruption’s effect on 
economic growth in democracies is not significant, while, in non-democracies, the effect is 
negative and significant. They conclude that “this corruption will be restricted to those 
activities and sectors that have relatively little impact on national economic performance 
because voters will definitely act to remove politicians that engage in significant growth-
impairing corruption” (Drury et al. 2006: 126). One of their contributions is that they use 
much broader panel data for their studies. They expand the time span of data set to 16 years. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Bardhan 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Edgardo, Lien and Pradhan 2001; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; 
Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Mauro 1995, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Tanzi 2002; Wei 2000. 
5 Drury, Krieckhaus and Lusztig 2006; Jensen 2003; Sandholtz and Koetze 2000;Warren 2004. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Data       
 
Corruption is extremely difficult to measure (Alesina and Weder 2002). In most literature 
(e.g., Wei 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1975), corruption is defined as the abuse of public power 
for private gain. In other words, corruption has secrecy, illegality, various ways of seeking 
benefits. Considering this nature of corruption, it is impossible to obtain objective 
information to measure the extent of corruption. Thus, most corruption measures are based 
on the surveys from the experts or firm managers in that country. Since most of these 
datasets are basically based on surveys of experts and consultants, they inevitably have a 
problem with subjectivity. Thus, it is important to check the validity and the reliability of the 
dataset.  
As Mauro (1997) points out, when the experts or the consultants made subjective 
judgments on the level of corruption of a certain country, they should be careful not to be 
influenced by the economic performance of that country. Thus, Mauro (1997: 83-84) argues 
that “researchers who use such indices must be extremely cautious in asserting a causal 
relationship between corruption and any economic variables found correlated with it.”  
With regard to the reliability of indices, Alesina and Weder (2002) test the correlation 
among corruption indicators. Even though most indexes are compiled by different 
institutions using very different experts and survey methodologies, they find that those 
corruption measures are highly correlated. 
One of the frequently used measures of corruption in academic research is the data from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by Political Risk Services, a private 
international investment risk service. In this dataset, high corruption means that “high 
government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are 
generally expected throughout lower levels” in the form of “bribes connected with import 
and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans.” 
The second source is the Business International (BI) Index. The Business International 
Index is also based on surveys of experts and consultants. It is said that the surveys are 
typically based on one consultant per one country (Wei 1999). Corruption in this data set is 
measured according to “the degree to which business transactions involve corruption or 
questionable payments.”  
The third source is the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization, has produced 
CPI every year since 1995. The TI index is not based on direct survey. Wei (1999) 
emphasizes that CPI should not be used to measure changes in corruption level over time for 
a particular country, since the TI indexes in different years are derived from a potentially 
different set of surveys.  
Even though there exists criticism 6  about the ICRG data, ICRG’s measurement of 
perceived level of corruption will be used as a proxy for the corruption measure in this study. 
The biggest merit of using the ICRG data is that only this data yield annual data since 1982. 
Compared to other data sets for the corruption measure, this provides data for a much longer 
period. The data set I built for this study covers 90 countries for 21 years from 1984–2004. 
                                                          
6 See Lambsdorff, 2005. 




Except for Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig (2006), most quantitative works on the effect of 
corruption on economy have been cross-country analyses or have used a very short time span. 
Consequentially, it is difficult to see the effect of corruption. Since the data I used in this 
study includes a much broader time span and more countries, I assume that I can test the 
effect of corruption with more confidence. 
 
3.2. Variables  
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
FDI Attractiveness    The dependent variable of this study is each country’s FDI 
attractiveness. For this purpose, I use the same formula to calculate the attractiveness as in 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Inward FDI Performance Index 
(UNCTAD Index).  
This index is “the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global 







INDi = The Inward FDI Performance Index of the ith country 
FDIi = The FDI inflows in the ith country 
FDIw = World FDI inflows 
GDPi = GDP in the ith country 
GDPw = World GDP 
 
The actual UNCTAD Index is a composite for three years. However, in this study FDI 
attractiveness is calculated annually from 1984 to 2004 for 90 countries. 
According to this measurement, if a value of this index is greater than one, it indicates 
that the country receives more FDI than its relative economic size. On the other hand, if a 
value of this index is below one, it means that it receives less. Accordingly, a negative value 
means that foreign investors actually disinvested in that period. 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
Corruption    In the ICRG data set, the corruption is coded on a seven-point scale, in 
which the minimum number, zero, is assigned to the most corrupt countries, while the 
maximum number, six, is given to the least corrupt countries. According to the data 
description, “The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial 
corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribe connected with import and 
export license, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans” (The PRS 
Group 2006: 31). To make the results easier to understand, I recoded the original data, so the 
least corrupt countries now have zero, whereas the most corrupt countries have six.  
As discussed, the effect of corruption is unclear. In many studies, corruption is assumed 
to distort the economic and financial environment. It reduces the efficiency of government 
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presence of prevailing corruption. That will make foreign investors conduct business 
effectively and regard those countries as less attractive. Thus, they would withhold their 
investment and even consider withdrawing their investment. Also the prevalence of 
corruption is hurting the governance in the potential host countries so foreign investors lose 
confidence in the market of those host countries.  
However, at the same time, as in many dependency theories, corruption can actually help 
attract more FDI in less developed countries. Thus, the effect of corruption can be only 
observed by empirical analysis. 
Democracy Level    This variable is drawn from the Polity IV database. The Polity IV 
dataset operationalizes institutionalized democracy and autocracy along five dimensions: 
competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints 
on the chief executive. The polity score, the composite measure of democratic institutions 
from Polity IV is calculated by subtracting the level of autocracy from the level of 
democracy, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). I recoded 
this variable by adding 10 to make further interpretation of the results easier. The impact of 
democratic institutions is also not decisive, as discussed. 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
GDP Growth Rate    According to Crenshaw (1991), economic growth is found to induce 
more foreign direct investment inflows to a country. It is almost obvious that foreign 
investors who want to maximize their profit from investment find fast-growing economies 
more attractive. I hypothesize that GDP Growth Rate is positively correlated with FDI 
inflows, so it will increase the FDI attractiveness of the host country. Data are from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006. 
GDP    The economic size itself is also expected to have impact on attracting foreign 
direct investment. Since more developed economies usually have more consumers with 
higher purchasing power, capital endowment, and good infrastructure, those factors are 
assumed to be attractive to foreign investors. Data are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2006. 
GDP per Capita    To take the effect of the population size and the quality of economies 
into account, GDP per Capita is used as a control variable. GDP per capita data is also from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006. As GDP, GDP per capita is also 
assumed to have a positive effect on the FDI attractiveness of the host countries. 
Trade-to-GDP    The most frequently used indicator of the importance of international 
transactions relative to domestic transactions is the trade-to-GDP ratio, which is the average 
share of exports and imports of goods and services in GDP. The trade-to-GDP ratio is often 
called the trade openness ratio. However, according to Naughton and Lardy (1996), the term 
“openness” to international competition may be somewhat misleading because a low trade–
to-GDP ratio does not necessarily mean that those countries have high obstacles (tariff or 
non-tariff) to foreign trade. Thus, the term “the trade-to-GDP ratio” will be used instead. 













90 countries,7 which provide all necessary data for 21 years, were selected for this study. 
Since the dataset is in the form of a time-series cross-section, it has tendency to have both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Thus, I use a panel-corrected standard 
errors method to correct for these problems that might distort the results. When the 
autocorrelation is detected by Wooldridge test, the prais-winston AR(1) model is used 
instead. 
To see the general effect of corruption on the FDI attractiveness, 90 countries are all 
included in the first model. Then I analyzed the sub-data groups. In the second analysis, the 
data is divided into two groups; one group includes 25 OECD countries and the other group 
includes 65 non-OECD countries. This analysis is expected to provide an answer for the 
question developed by the dependency theorists. In the third analysis, I divide the data into 
two sub-groups; one includes 63 countries of which the average democracy level for 21 years 
from 1984 to 2004 is above zero, while the other group includes 27 countries of which the 
average democracy level is below zero. In the fourth analysis, the sub-groups were divided 
according to their standard deviation of democracy level. The countries with relatively bigger 
standard deviation mostly have experienced the transitional period. With this analysis, we 
can see how corruption affects the FDI attractiveness of those countries which are in dire 
need for the FDI for their economic development. 
 
4.1. Analysis of 90 Countries 
 
The first analysis of 90 countries confirms the view that corruption hurts the FDI 
attractiveness of host countries. As shown in Table 1, we can see that a one point increase in 
the perceived level of corruption will decrease the FDI attractiveness, the annual calculation 
of UNCTAD inward FDI Performance Index, by about 0.19 point on average, ceteris paribus. 
Also the more democratic countries and the faster growing economies are positively related 
to the higher score in FDI attractiveness as expected by most liberal economists.  
Thus, we can reject the arguments that MNEs have wanted to invest in more corrupt and 
less democratic states because they wanted to exploit more rent benefits from their 
investment. 
 
4.2. Comparison: OECD Countries vs. Non-OECD Countries 
 
As shown in Graph 1, we can see the distinctive difference between OECD member 
countries and non-OECD member countries in terms of their average level of corruption. For 
those 25 countries8 which are included in this study, the average of corruption level is 
1.25484 with the standard deviation of 0.602. On the other hand, the average corruption level 
of those non-OECD member countries is 3.27021 with the standard deviation of 0.654. 
This separation of sample groups is employed to see the differential effects of corruption 
on the countries with different characteristics. 
The most notable difference between OECD member countries and non-OECD member  
                                                          
7 See Appendix for the list of countries included in this study. 
8 See Appendix for the list of countries. 
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Table 1. Analysis of 90 Countries: The Effects of Corruption on FDI Attractiveness, 1984-
2004 
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GDP growth rate 
 
0.0853107** 
                  (0.020148) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.0000358** 








                 (0.6152015) 
Number of observations 1855 
R2 0.1596 
Note: ** significant at the 95 percent level.  
 
Graph 1. Comparison between OECE and Non-OECD Countries: Average and Standard 























Table 2. Comparison: OECD Countries vs. Non-OECD Countries 
Coefficients (Standard error)  
OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
Corruption -0.1623554 
                     (0.1863122) 
-0.1493523** 
                     (0.0703864) 
Democracy level 0.1056059 
                      (0.0876573) 
0.0633041** 
                    (0.0117775) 
GDP 1.82e-13 
                         (1.84e-13) 
1.18e-12 
                       (6.26e-13) 
GDP growth rate -0.0102843 
                      (0.0358436) 
0.0997339** 
                   (0.0210754) 
GDP per capita -0.0000681** 
                        (0.000034) 
-0.0001369** 
                     (0.000024) 
Trade-to-GDP 0.0444163** 
                      (0.0079612) 
0.0357922** 
                    (0.0076028) 
  Constant -0.3769678 
                        (2.107937) 
-0.1286392 
                   (0.0076028) 
Number of observations 517 1338 
R2 0.0754 0.1471 
Note: ** significant at the 95 percent level. 
 
 
countries is the effect of the corruption on FDI attractiveness. For non-OECD member 
countries, corruption level is negatively related to their FDI attractiveness. That negative is 
statistically significant at a 95 percent level. Also even within non-OECD member countries, 
more democratic countries are more attractive for foreign investors than less democratic 
countries. 
However, both corruption level and democracy level do not have any statistically 
significant effect on FDI attractiveness for the OECD member countries. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the corruption level and the democracy level of the OECD member 
countries have been pretty stable for a longer time period. That is, corruption levels and 
democracy levels have not varied much. Since these independent variables have not varied, 
they cannot explain the variation of the dependent variable.  
From this analysis, we can also reject the argument that less developed countries can 
attract more foreign investment by having enough corruption which can work as grease. 
Even within those non-OECD member countries, corruption would hurt the FDI 
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Graph 2. Comparison between Countries with Average Democracy Level < 0 and Countries 


















Table 3. Comparison: Countries with Average Democracy Level > 0 vs. Countries with 
Average Democracy Level < 0 
Coefficients (Standard error)  
Countries with the average 
democracy level > 0 
Countries with the average 
democracy level < 0 
Corruption -0.1573741* 
                       (0.0809837) 
-0.1582279* 
                 (0.0898981) 
Democracy level 0.1235413** 
                        (0.0202603) 
-0.0427886** 
                (0.0184735) 
GDP 9.58e-14 
                          (7.51e-14) 
1.56e-12** 
                   (5.21e-13) 
GDP growth rate 0.1010922** 
                       (0.0337389) 
0.054265** 
                (0.0243064) 
GDP per capita -0.0000393** 
                       (0.0000147) 
-0.0003779** 
               (0.0000735) 
Trade-to-GDP 0.0372186** 
                       (0.0070278) 
0.0399378** 
                (0.0050249) 
  Constant -1.186361* 
                       (0.6976446) 
0.6881823 
                (0.7736761) 
Number of observations 1303 552 
R2 0.1916 0.0943 
Note: ** significant at the 95 percent level, *significant at the 90 percent level. 





4.3. Comparison: Countries with Average Democracy Level > 0 vs. Countries with  
Average Democracy Level < 0 
 
In the third analysis, the sub-groups are divided according to their average democracy 
level. Since the range of the Polity IV data is -10 to 10, I arbitrarily make a cut point at 0. 
Following this cut point at 0, the average democracy level is below 0 for 27 countries.9 As 
shown in Graph 2, these two groups also have different characteristics with respect to the 
corruption level. For those countries of which the average democracy level is below 0 for 21 
years from 1984 to 2004, the average corruption level is 3.54214 with the standard deviation 
of 0.700. On the other hand, the average corruption level is 2.35392 with the standard 
deviation of 0.614 for those countries of which the average democracy level is above 0 for 
the time period of this study. 
As shown in Table 3, higher corruption is related to lower FDI attractiveness for both 
groups. However, it is statistically significant at 90 percent level this time. Corruption has 
almost same effect in both groups. The coefficients of corruption on FDI attractiveness are -
0.1573741 and -0.1582279 for the countries with the average democracy level above 0 and 
for the countries with the average democracy level below 0, respectively.  
The notable difference between two sub-groups in this analysis is the effect of democracy 
level on FDI attractiveness. For those countries with the average democracy level above 0, 
the higher level of democracy is related to higher FDI attractiveness. This result is 
statistically significant at 95 percent level. On the other hand, the democracy level is 
negatively related to the FDI attractiveness for those countries with the average democracy 
level below 0. One point increase in democracy level will lead to 0.0427886 point decrease 
in FDI attractiveness index. This result can mean that MNEs will prefer more autocratic 
government after the corruption level is controlled. This result is confirming the argument of 
dependency theorists that MNEs will choose less democratic countries to exploit more 
benefits from their investment.  
 
4.4. Comparison: Comparison: Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy  
Level < 3 vs. Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy Level > 3 
 
In this analysis, sub-groups are divided according to the standard deviation of democracy 
level. The arbitrary cut point in this analysis is the standard deviation of 3.00. I separate these 
two sub-groups to see the differential effects of corruption on FDI attractiveness between 
more stable and less stable regimes. The countries10 with a standard deviation of democracy 
level larger than 3 can be considered less stable regimes that have experienced the 
transitional period.  
These two sub-groups also have different characteristics with respect to the corruption 
level. As shown in Graph 3, less stable countries, of which the standard deviation of 
democracy level is bigger than 3, have a higher level of corruption than more stable countries 
on average. This result is similar to the World Bank (2000) in that countries in transitional 
periods experience high corruption.  
As shown in Table 4, corruption has more damaging effects on the economy in the less  
                                                          
9 See Appendix for the list of countries. 
10 See Appendix for the list of countries. 
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Graph 3. Comparison between Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy Level > 3 
and Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy Level < 3: Average and Standard 

















Table 4. Comparison: Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy Level < 3 vs. 
Countries with Standard Deviation of Democracy Level > 3 
Coefficients (Standard error)  
Countries with the standard 
deviation of democracy level<3
Countries with the standard 
deviation of democracy level>3 
Corruption -0.1065892 
                      (0.0918313) 
-0.2920831** 
                        (0.0718327) 
Democracy level 0.0833738** 
                      (0.0154074) 
 0.0513684** 
                        (0.0185315) 
GDP 1.77e-13** 
                         (9.95e-14) 
7.41e-13** 
                          (9.27e-13) 
GDP growth rate 0.0672153** 
                      (0.0332983) 
 0.0997094** 
                         (0.032803) 
GDP per capita -0.0000486** 
                      (0.0000178) 
-0.0000562 
                        (0.0000783) 
Trade-to-GDP 0.0427012** 
                        (0.008457) 
0.0227542** 
                        (0.0052886) 
  Constant -0.8322506 
                      (0.8609737) 
1.536892** 
                        (0.7062937) 
Number of observations 1172 683 
R2 0.1792 0.1107 
Note: ** significant at the 95 percent level. 




stable countries, where as it has statistically insignificant effect in the more stable countries. 
For those countries with the standard deviation of democracy level bigger than 3, the 
coefficient of corruption level on FDI attractiveness is -0.2920831 and this is statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level. Compared with the magnitude of impact of corruption in 
other sub-groups in this study, the impact of corruption is much stronger in less stable 
countries. It is almost two times larger than the coefficients of other sub-groups. Thus, we 
can conclude that corruption is more harmful for those countries which have experienced or 
are experiencing the transitional period.  
With regard to the democracy level, a higher democracy level is related to higher FDI 
attractiveness for both less stable and more stable countries. This result is statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level. 
In sum, the results of this study show that corruption has a negative effect on the FDI 
attractiveness of host countries. Corruption especially causes more detrimental problems for 





It has long been argued whether the corruption is an obstacle or a benefit. Policy makers 
as well as scholars have provided contradictory theoretical arguments about the effect of 
corruption on economies. Questions around contending perspectives on this relationship 
between the level of corruption and FDI can only be solved by an empirical test. This study 
is intended to solve that question. 
Empirical results from this study suggest that corruption generally has harmful effect on 
attracting FDI. When I investigated the differential effect of corruption on various sub-group 
samples, corruption had a stronger negative effect on those countries in which the democracy 
level has fluctuated more turbulently. Also those countries with more experience in 
autocracy are more heavily affected by corruption. In most cases, those countries are indeed 
in dire need of FDI for their economic growth. Thus, these results confirm the arguments by 
mainstream liberal economists that corruption is harmful in attracting FDI. 
However, one notable finding from this study is that more autocratic countries will attract 
more FDI compared to their GDP share after controlling for the effect of corruption. This 
result implies that the behavior of MNEs depends on the regime type. If MNEs consider FDI 
opportunities among less democratic countries, they would prefer more autocratic countries.  
Since many less democratic countries in the Middle East and Africa have attracted FDI 
because of their natural resources endowment, it will provide us with a better understanding 
if we can incorporate those variables in future study.  
In conclusion, this study has attempted to see whether corruption has harmful effect on 
FDI attractiveness by using panel data with 90 countries for 21 years. This study also finds 
that corruption actually causes more problems for those countries which need FDI for their 
economic development. Thus, corruption should be controlled not only for political purposes 
but also for the economic prosperity of those countries. 
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List of 90 countries in this study 
Albania Ecuador Jamaica Philippines 
Algeria Egypt Japan Portugal 
Angola El Salvador Jordan Senegal 
Argentina Ethiopia Kenya Sierra Leone 
Australia Finland Madagascar South Africa 
Austria France Malawi South Korea 
Bangladesh Gabon Malaysia Spain 
Belgium Gambia Mali Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Ghana Mexico Sweden 
Botswana Greece Morocco Switzerland 
Brazil Guatemala Mozambique Syria 
Bulgaria Guinea Netherlands Thailand 
Cameroon Guyana New Zealand Togo 
Canada Haiti Nicaragua Trinidad & Tobago 
Chile Honduras Niger Turkey 
China Hungary Nigeria United Kingdom 
Columbia Iceland Norway United States 
Congo India Oman Uruguay 
Congo, DR Indonesia Pakistan Venezuela 
Costa Rica Iran Panama Zambia 
Cyprus Ireland Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe 
Denmark Israel Paraguay   
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List of 25 OECD countries in this study 
Australia Greece Netherlands Switzerland 
Austria Hungary New Zealand Turkey 
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List of 63 countries with the average democracy level > 0 
Albania Dominican Rep Jamaica Portugal 
Argentina Ecuador Japan Senegal 
Australia El Salvador Madagascar South Africa 
Austria Finland Malaysia South Korea 
Bangladesh France Mali Spain 
Belgium Gambia Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Greece Netherlands Sweden 
Botswana Guatemala New Zealand Switzerland 
Brazil Guyana Nicaragua Thailand 
Bulgaria Honduras Norway Trinidad & Tobago 
Canada Hungary Pakistan Turkey 
Chile Iceland Panama United Kingdom 
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List of 27 countries with the average democracy level < 0 
Algeria Ethiopia Jordan Oman 
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Egypt Iran Nigeria  
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List of 57 countries with the standard deviation of democracy level < 3 
Angola Dominican Rep Israel Spain 
Argentina Ecuador Italy Sri Lanka 
Australia Egypt Jamaica Sweden 
Austria El Salvador Japan Switzerland 
Belgium Ethiopia Jordan Syria 
Bolivia Finland Malaysia Togo 
Botswana France Morocco Trinidad & Tobago 
Brazil Gabon Netherlands Turkey 
Cameroon Greece New Zealand United Kingdom 
Canada Guinea Norway United States 
China Guyana Oman Venezuela 
Columbia Honduras Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Iceland Peru  
Cyprus India Portugal  
Denmark Ireland South Africa  
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